1. From Tughril Beg to Alp Arslan: The Eastward Expansion of the Seljuk Frontiers
And at that time the Seljuks were bringing under their rule Iran, Iraq, what we today geographically call Azerbaijan, and Eastern Anatolia. This happens in the time of Tughril. That is, the borders of the state are now expanding.
In Iraq he undermines Shi'i dominance. Sultan Tughril takes the Abbasid caliphate under their control. Sultan Tughril dies without leaving an heir, but the Seljuks establish their rule in this region, and when Sultan Tughril dies without an heir, Alp Arslan, the son of his brother Chaghri Beg, ascends the throne of the Great Seljuks.
Actually, when Alp Arslan comes to the throne, I mean, he does so by overthrowing Chaghri Beg. Let us underline this too. So that we know who Alp Arslan is: he overthrows his father Chaghri Beg. He takes the throne. Alp Arslan is that kind of person. And his son Alp Arslan succeeds. In the time of Sultan Alp Arslan, too, the Seljuks continue to grow. Georgia — Alp Arslan, and he brings Northern Syria under his rule and consolidates Seljuk dominance in Eastern Anatolia.
I said Eastern Anatolia. To the west of the Seljuks, that is, the Byzantines are the neighbour. When you say Georgia up north, at that time Georgia was normally from the northern Khazar Turks; he brings them under his rule as well, but Georgia — the Turks who came from the northern Khazar region — they were, however, Christian, not Muslim. At that time, those Georgians come to know Islam later. After Alp Arslan — just as he sends his emirs to southern Syria, Alp Arslan himself also besieges and takes Aleppo.
And although Alp Arslan had chosen Egypt as his target, just as he was about to set out from Aleppo he received news of the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV's campaign in Anatolia, and he quickly turned back.
2. Manzikert 1071 and the Beginning of Turkish-Islamic Civilisation in Anatolia
As is well known, Sultan Alp Arslan wins the battle fought on the Plain of Manzikert in August 1071, and thus the Turks — the foundations of an Islamic state in Anatolia are thus laid.
After 1071 — look, before 1071, both in the time of the Umayyads and in the time of the Abbasids, there were some Muslims, you know, who came to Anatolia. But, however, they had no weight, no influence, nothing at all. And thus a Turkish-Islamic civilisation begins in Anatolia.
I am deliberately putting "Turkish" at the front of it like this. Because the Turks have their own religious understanding, perception and way of living it — you know how in the talks I make the distinction between lower Mesopotamia and upper Mesopotamia. At the point of upper Mesopotamia, the Turks' perception and understanding of religion is somewhat different.
3. Ahmad Yasawi, Rumi, Haji Bektash Veli, Yunus Emre: The Sufism of Upper Mesopotamia
Ahmad Yasawi has an influence on this.
And Ahmad Yasawi is interesting: he learned the Sufism of lower Mesopotamia, but he lived and kept alive the Sufism of upper Mesopotamia. For example, Yasawi, with his jura (a small saz) in his hand, with his jura in his hand, went from village to village and all the Turks under the banner of Islam — For example, among the Turks, apart from warfare, their literature is also strong.
You know, for example, nowadays they shoot historical films and so on, and in them they too play the jura and recite poems like this, sing hymns (ilahis) and so on. The Turks are rather more poetic in times of peace. And for example — it coincides with the last period of the Seljuks, you know — Yunus, for example, has a Divan. Hazrat Pir, Rumi (Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi), has a Divan. Haji Bektash Veli has a Divan. For instance, and in Anatolia, for example, those who blended the Islam particular to Anatolia, in this sense Hazrat Rumi, Yunus Emre, Haji Bektash Veli — here, these lands — later we can also add Haji Bayram.
They knead these lands not with the Islam of lower Mesopotamia but with the Islam of upper Mesopotamia. Normally, in Anatolia now — while coming towards Anatolia, the Turks bring with them their own culture and their own belief systems as well. Of course, the Islamic world had meanwhile spread over a wider population. There is a multifaceted culture.
4. The Seljuks' Surroundings: Byzantium, the Fatimids, and the Threat of the Batiniyya and the Kharijites
For example, down in North Africa there is the Fatimid State. The Fatimid State is a different kind of state structure. It is Shi'a. Then there are the Mamluks. It is a separate state structure. That is, normally, when we actually look, when we look at the Seljuks at that time, there is Byzantium to the east.
Normally, when we go down south, there is the Fatimid State in North Africa, which comes as far as Egypt. It occupies as far as Egypt. This is interesting. And then there is also the Batiniyya in the picture. There are the Kharijites. And then, at this point, there are a great many elements affecting the Seljuks from within and affecting them from outside.
But while Islam was settling in Anatolia, all of them were far removed from the Batiniyya, from Kharijism, from Fatimism, from the Ismailis and from ancient Greek philosophy. An interesting thing. And also, among the Turks there is not much of this concern, you know, of shutting ourselves away in madrasas and learning knowledge in fine detail. Because they are fighting a lot, constantly. I mean, if you look at the Turkish principalities before the Seljuks, there is not a single summer in which they did not fight. They always fought. They are always in a state of war.
In winter they withdraw to their winter quarters. They feed their horses. They sharpen their swords. They repair their shields. When summer comes, they go out to jihad. Because their livelihood is war booty. Among the Turks there is not much craftsmanship. Among the Turks there is not much trade. Among the Turks there is not much agriculture either — the Turks earn their livelihood by fighting. Booty. In Islam, too, the best of provisions is, in the first degree, booty. The second is trade. And when the Seljuks went from a settled city-state to a state ruling over such a wide geography, there is legal pluralism, multilingualism, legal pluralism, multilingualism. Among the Seljuks. Now, as the Seljuks move from here to there, they also see the mistakes of the Umayyads and the Abbasids. Now let us normally put these mistakes clearly into words, so that the difference between the Seljuks and the Umayyads or the Abbasids can also be seen.
That is, normally the Umayyads, for example, turn the caliphate directly into a sultanate. Indeed, this is one of the greatest mistakes, the greatest handicaps, of what they did. Normally the greatest — this is my own personal opinion.
5. The Umayyads' Greatest Betrayal: Politicising Religion and Changing the Order of the Friday Prayer
One of their greatest, greatest, greatest betrayals. I characterise this as betrayal. They politicise religion.
Now those listening to the sohbet (spiritual discourse), those who are pro-Umayyad, will get very angry with me. The Umayyads politicise religion. I mean, I can say this very clearly and comfortably. After Hz. Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali and Hazrat Hasan, religion becomes completely politicised in the time of the Umayyads. When that happens, well, religion — underline this too — they put religion at the service of politics. Now, between it and the Seljuks — you know, that Anatolian Islam, let me characterise it that way. The differences in the triangle of state, religion and politics that the Umayyads applied. That is, it is from here that the Umayyads strike the Islamic world with the greatest dagger. That is, whatever kind of religion politics wants — politics, look, the Umayyads organise religion the way politics wants.
You know, sometimes, sometimes I say — you know, I give a short example like this. I say that we are still praying the Friday prayer of the Umayyads. Look, pay attention to this. How was the Friday prayer of the Prophet (peace be upon him)? First the prayer, then the sermon (khutba). Up until Hz. Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali and our master Hazrat Hasan, the Friday prayers were performed this way. First the prayer, then the sermon. Like the Eid prayers.
How do you perform the Eid prayer? First the prayer, then the sermon — it's the same thing. Look, the way the Eid prayer and the Friday prayer are performed is the same. In the Eid prayer the imam first leads the prayer, and after that he goes up for the sermon. After the sermon he comes and sits on the minbar again, has the supplication made, and it ends. That is all the Eid prayer is. Friday is the same. On Friday the imam first leads the prayer. The Prophet (peace be upon him) and the 4, 5 caliphs also performed it this way. First the Friday prayer is performed, then the sermon is delivered.
The Umayyads change this; they say the sermon will be delivered first. The reason is this. Because in the sermon they disparage the Ahl al-Bayt — that Hz. our master Husayn made a mistake, and even that Hz. our master Husayn, because he rebelled (baghi) in a state of unbelief, died in a state of unbelief — they issue a fatwa to that effect. In the sermons, naturally, those who love our master Hazrat Ali and Hazrat Hasan and Husayn, those who carry love for the Ahl al-Bayt, do not want to listen to this sermon. They walk out, they empty the mosque. So then the Umayyads swap the places of the sermon and the prayer. Now the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) continues the same prayer. The Ottomans continued it in the same way. Pay attention — the Seljuks also continued it in the same way. That is, they took that practice of the Umayyads on for themselves.
6. The Second Treachery of the Umayyads: Destroying Justice — Arab–Mawali Racism
And normally, for instance, one of the greatest shortcomings of the Umayyads is that they destroyed the justice of Islam.
The mechanism of justice did not allow everyone to live on an equal footing. That is, if you are an Arab, the justice for you is one thing. If you are a mawla — that is, if you are not an Arab — the law and justice applied to you is another. With the Umayyads this happened because racism began. Arabs are first-class Muslims and the first-class race.
Non-Arabs are mawali. They are not first-class Muslims. Nor are they the first-class race. Just like now in Saudi Arabia, like in the other Arab countries — look, from there you come to our day. Now when you come to our day, in Saudi Arabia the good Muslims, the ones who know the religion, are the Saudis, the Arabs. As for the others — whoever you are, you don't know the religion. They know it best. And normally the Umayyads at this point — despite the Prophet (peace be upon him), sallallahu alayhi wa sallam, forbidding race-based [distinction] so strongly, despite the Qur'an forbidding race-based tribalism — what did they do?
Well, they carried on with racism in their own way. Now, these conditions of the Umayyads, these attitudes — there are many more things on this subject. I have gathered them under four main headings. If we examine them in finer detail there are many more, for instance, uh, the interpretation of the Qur'an, its exegesis (tafsir), the interpretation of the hadiths, their exegesis, and in fiqh, when jurisprudence is being done at this point, something different — that is, the Qur'an and the Sunna not being the measure, but fiqh changing according to the sultan's measure — things like these. And among the Seljuks and the Abbasids this continued too. Among all these, the Seljuks have an endeavour to live a religion purely within the circle of the Qur'an and Sunna.
Because there is Batiniyya on one side, the Assassins (Hashshashin) on one side, the Ismailis on one side, and then down below the Fatimids on one side. These are the things, the countries and the outlooks surrounding the Seljuks like this, and Byzantium on one side, the Seljuks in the midst of them, and the Seljuks at this point are keeping their own interpretation of religion and their own interpretation of the state standing, in their own way. But since the Seljuk state is a state gathered together from city-states, the state hierarchy has not fully settled. The religious hierarchy has not fully settled either. The political hierarchy has not fully settled either.
7. al-Juwayni and al-Kunduri: The Shi'i Vizier's Enmity Toward the Sunni Scholar
Now we continue. After the death of al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali comes under the patronage of Nizam al-Mulk and is given a few projects. Use your knowledge for the strengthening of pure fiqh. He writes a refutation against Batiniyya, which is a great danger religiously, intellectually and politically. Who is al-Juwayni?
Al-Juwayni is an Ash'ari theologian (mutakallim). Who is al-Ghazali? He too is an Ash'ari. Who is al-Juwayni? A Shafi'i jurist. Who is al-Ghazali? Al-Ghazali too is a Shafi'i jurist. Now sometimes I tell friends, those who are going to read the Ihya', read the Ihya' carefully. Al-Ghazali himself is a Shafi'i and an Ash'ari. That is why I say, read the Ihya' carefully. That is, if your fiqh — Hanafi fiqh — and, in creed, your Maturidi creed are not solid, read al-Ghazali carefully. Look, read al-Ghazali carefully. When you are going to read the Ihya'. In his time, within the Seljuks, there is a vizier of the Great Seljuks who defends Shi'i and Mu'tazili views and does not want Ash'arism to grow stronger either.
'Amid al-Mulk al-Kunduri. This al-Kunduri is the grand vizier of the Seljuks. That is, today's prime minister. This al-Kunduri is hostile to al-Juwayni. Because al-Juwayni is a Sunni, an Ash'ari. And he himself is a Shafi'i. But al-Kunduri — these are historical notes. Al-Kunduri, in his own way, holds Shi'i and Mu'tazili views. This being so, al-Kunduri and al-Juwayni are never on the same page. In fact al-Juwayni is even sent into exile. By this al-Kunduri.
But when does Tughril Beg die? And normally, after Tughril Beg dies, Alp Arslan comes to the head of the state. Alp Arslan's first act is to remove al-Kunduri from the vizierate. He removes al-Kunduri from the vizierate and makes Nizam al-Mulk grand vizier.
8. The Paths of Nizam al-Mulk and al-Ghazali Converge: The Building of the Sunni System
This is the place where the paths of Nizam al-Mulk and Alp Arslan converge.
And the danger is out in the open. Alp Arslan, already during his own beylik, is someone who identified these dangers and fought against them. That is why he topples Chaghri Beg, sits on the throne himself, makes Nizam al-Mulk grand vizier, and also tells him about the dangers. Then Nizam al-Mulk appoints al-Juwayni, whom he knows closely, to the head of the Nizamiyya madrasas as chief scholar — or what do you call it today? He appoints al-Juwayni as rector of the highest institution of the university. But of course, normally, he brings al-Juwayni in among the professors (mudarris) of the Nizamiyya Madrasa. He is appointed. But normally, well, with the death of al-Juwayni, someone whom we could call the highest intellectual of Sunni kalam at that point, for that day, has passed away.
This is a vacuum. It is a vacuum from the state's point of view as well. Al-Ghazali is the greatest candidate for it. Because as a school he is in al-Juwayni's school. He is in Nizam al-Mulk's school. Al-Juwayni what? Let's put Nizam al-Mulk at the top. Because the state is at the top. Nizam al-Mulk, al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali — the three are people on the same line. And al-Ghazali normally comes to the head of the Nizamiyya madrasas.
But when al-Ghazali first takes the post at that time, he is not yet a system theorist. He is, then, a typical Ash'ari-Shafi'i scholar, but very accomplished in knowledge. You know — kalam, fiqh, hadith, tafsir. He has mastery of Arabic, mastery of chemistry, of mathematics. He is, as you know, a person of knowledge through and through, and a person of tremendous intelligence. Al-Ghazali has a very practical intelligence. That is, he has a superior intelligence to his contemporaries. He has superior knowledge. But he is not a man of systems. What I am saying is open to criticism. But he is not a man of systems. The one who makes him a man of systems, who injects him into the system, who seats him in the system, places him, adapts him, is Nizam al-Mulk.
He writes a refutation against Batiniyya, which is a great danger religiously, intellectually and politically. Yes. Nizam al-Mulk is a thoroughly statist person who produces projects on behalf of the state. He is such a statist person — Alp Arslan is a thorough mujahid khagan, a sultan. And Nizam al-Mulk is a thorough organizer of the state. Alp Arslan conquers. Nizam al-Mulk builds up the places he conquered. He revives them anew. Now, you take a place by the sword, but you need to govern it with reason.
You need to govern it with wisdom ('irfan), with culture. Taking it by the sword is not enough. Because Nizam al-Mulk is aware of this. He builds up the places Alp Arslan conquered, establishes marketplaces, supports craftsmen. I am giving examples — there, he supports scholars. And in every conquered place a Nizamiyya madrasa is established. Mosques are established, fountains are built, caravanserais are built. Coins are distributed to the poor, the needy, the people. Agriculture there is made viable. Animal husbandry is made viable. Trade is made viable. And the Seljuk state, in this sense, is a state loved by both Muslim and non-Muslim elements.
9. The Distinction Between the Ja'fari School and the Shi'a: Imam Ja'far Is of the Ahl al-Bayt
That is why, when the Seljuk Sultan passed away, everyone grieved, and normally Nizam al-Mulk at this point — and at the same time, religiously, Nizam al-Mulk [stood against] our Batiniyya, the Ismailis, the Fatimids — that is, the non-Ja'fari Shi'a, the non-Ja'fari, I am especially underlining this, look, there is a point where everyone goes wrong.
The Ja'fari school is one thing, the Shi'a is another. Imam Ja'far is our imam too. He is also the teacher of Imam Abu Hanifa (Imam-i A'zam). Do not confuse today's Shi'a with the Ja'fari school or with Imam Ja'far. I am especially underlining this. Imam Ja'far is of the Ahl al-Bayt. His creed is the Qur'an and the Sunna. He himself is at the same time a Sufi. So separate today's Shi'a from the Ja'fari school. I especially, you know, set apart the Ja'faris and Imam Ja'far.
May the Almighty (Allah) keep my tongue from saying a word against him. (Amin.) May He keep you from it too. (Amin.) He is of the Ahl al-Bayt. That is why our tongue does not reach out against him. May Allah protect us. (Amin.) Now, well, normally, together with Nizam al-Mulk, Alp Arslan begins to establish the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in Anatolia. Now this irritates a certain group — you know, the Umayyad-style Arabists.
10. Batiniyya–Ismailis–the Assassins (Hashashin): The Seljuks' Internal «PKK and ISIS»
When Turkish-Islamic synthesis is mentioned, they say, you know, "What are we becoming?" and so on. This is my analysis. Those who object to it may object, but when they object, they will put documents in front of me. They will not speak without documents. And normally, at that time, the Seljuk State — with its military organization, its political stability, its winning of wars in so many areas, its suppression of rebellions — normally at that time, in the Middle Ages, it can be said that it became the most powerful state in the region.
And Nizam al-Mulk. Those who spread terror in the country in order to destroy the Seljuks and eliminate their leaders — they will get angry at this part now too. He destroys Hasan Sabbah and his gang, who spread terror in the country. Well, of course, normally one of the dangers, so to speak, within the greatest state of that era is Batiniyya. It is Ismailism, it is the Assassins (Hashashin). These are, you know, a thing within the country's borders — a danger.
Just as now they have planted the Salafi-Wahhabi danger among us. Look, just the other day more police officers were martyred. Whether it's ISIS, or DAESH — there are no letters left. These people, normally, just as now among us, went and killed 3 of our police officers, martyred them. 7 of our police officers, you know, were wounded. They have armed themselves. Well, of course, this humble one (fakir) has been saying it for years. These — these are an organization founded by the CIA.
At that time, these Batinis, these Assassins, this Ismailism were the same. They had organized and settled within the state like a tumor. There were even viziers who supported them. Now these — for example, I am giving an example. This now is ISIS, is DAESH. If they did not receive support from somewhere, could they organize like this? Could they arm themselves like this? So it means they have nested in certain channels of the state, so that they gallop freely in this country. I mean, could the PKK have grown this strong without the support of the state or of someone?
We were still going to high school back then. When I was in high school, their name was Kürdarı Azadi. They would generally be Dev-Genç. They would be Kürdarı Azadi. They would be Dev-Sol. Then they became TİKKO. These — these were also inside TİKKO like this. Now Hakan will be irritated by these observations of mine, but they infiltrated. For example, well, they infiltrated the leftist organizations. Yes. For example, this Salafi-Wahhabi lot also, I mean, appears as if they were one of us, don't they? They declare all Muslims unbelievers (takfir). Look, if someone who calls himself a Muslim declares a Muslim an unbeliever, he is dangerous. Watch out for him. His roots are outside. Now, at that time, normally, the Seljuks' internal enemy at this point was Ismailism, the Assassins, and then Batiniyya. The state needs to mount an intellectual defense against them too.
11. Al-Ghazali's Task: A Synthesis of Sunni Fiqh, Creed, Ethics, Politics and Bureaucracy
The understanding of the state at that time. Well, this being so, a great task falls to al-Ghazali in this matter. What is this great task? Intellectual and philosophical answers need to be given against them. Religious, intellectual and philosophical answers need to be given. Al-Ghazali — this, in parentheses, to the paragraph. Al-Ghazali does full justice to this.
After a while he is appointed to Baghdad. He attains the highest scholarly position. He becomes as famous as the caliph. Yes. This project given to al-Ghazali is the strengthening of Sunni fiqh, the strengthening of the Sunni creed ('aqa'id), the strengthening of Sunni politics, the strengthening of a Sunni state. Because fiqh must be at an ethical level, and that juristic and ethical level must also be known and lived at the center of politics and in the bureaucracy.
Look, if Islamic fiqh were a plain fiqh, if there were no ethics, it would be of no use. Fiqh needs to unite with ethics. When it unites with ethics, politics — politics too — needs to design itself with this fiqh and this ethics. When politics designs itself this way, the bureaucracy also designs itself this way. That is, for a state and a nation to be saved from corruption, fiqh–ethics–politics–bureaucracy, these four elements, four elements, need to meet at a common point. I mean, what we call politics is the one at the head of the state — today you call him president, at that time, sultan.
The sultan will both be subject to fiqh and be ethical. He will keep ethics at the forefront. If there is no fiqh and no ethics in the sultan, then, you know, it is absent in politics too. Then corruption also occurs in the bureaucracy. Then in the bureaucracy too there is no justice, no fiqh, no ethics. In the bureaucracy. What do you call bureaucracy? The Seljuk sultan. Then the viziers. Then the governors. Then the military commanders, the qadis. That is, those who give judgment in the courts. So the Seljuks at this point — or rather, al-Ghazali actually performs a very great task here.
How does he perform a very great task? He encircles politics, that is, he encircles the state. He sets limits on the state and normally brings it into such a state that in al-Ghazali, for example, there is no sanctifying of the sultan as with the Abbasids. In al-Ghazali there is no sanctifying of the sultan as with the Umayyads. In al-Ghazali there is no seeing the head of state at the same time as the caliph of Allah, as with the Fatimids. In al-Ghazali there is no seeing, as with the Shia, normally the ayatollah there as the caliph of Allah.
As a mechanism of politics. The standard that al-Ghazali actually brought at this point is something magnificent in the geography of that day and in the order of states of that day. And normally al-Ghazali establishes a system that will encircle all of them on every side: the people and the state, politics, the bureaucracy, the scholars. And while establishing this system, the Ihya' he wrote becomes a magnificent work on this subject. Look, then you will say: have you read the Ihya'? No. But the Ihya' fulfils its duty for that time. It does its job. I mean, the Ihya', and normally this thing I call fiqh is law. Ha, at the same time, I mean normally, with al-Ghazali at this point, this whole way of life, the ethics of life, the law of the state and politics become encircled. I mean, one of his greatest tasks is his writing a refutation of the Batiniyya. I mean, what is there in Batinism? There is a hidden imam. Fundamentally, philosophically, there is hidden knowledge in Batinism.
And the Batinis at that time display an example of loyalty outside the state. I mean, their loyalty is not to the state. Their loyalty is not to the sultan they are subject to. They have, in their own view, a hidden imam. Thus their law is hidden too, their exegesis is hidden too. Everything of theirs is hidden. This is a threat to the Seljuk state. It is a great threat at the same time. Because at that time these people are organising, you see, various assassinations like this. Against the state, against statesmen, against viziers, against scholars. I mean, there is the governor of some place, an assassination is organised. Somewhere there is a learned person, an assassination is organised against him. The Batinis don't just sit still where they are. I mean, think of it like a PKK inside, think of it like an ISIS. Batinism. Just as today these are two great dangers for the state, Batinism too was a danger for the state at that time. But I have determined this, in my own view.
Al-Ghazali did not declare the Batinis unbelievers (takfir). As I said, being, as I said, highly intelligent, he damaged the legitimacy of Batinism with his knowledge, and when he damaged its legitimacy with that knowledge, the people's deference towards him, the people's respect towards him and the state's view of him were already strengthened even further. But while al-Ghazali was doing this — up until that day the Umayyad-Abbasid vein, just as it is now, opposes Sufism, is hostile to it. Now, just as the Saudis are hostile to Sufism, right, and those raised there who consider themselves scholars also declare the Sufis unbelievers, saying, "You have a different religion."
12. Bringing Sufism into the System: The Birth of Anatolian Islam
Well, one of the most important things al-Ghazali did is that he brings Sufism into the system.
Look, he brings Sufism into the system. If there are people of Sufism in Anatolia right now, they are still bound to al-Ghazali on the intellectual plane. This is al-Ghazali, because for that day he sets the norms of Sufism, he sets its standard. He brings it to the line of the Qur'an and the Sunna. And the foundation of Anatolian Islam is laid in this way.
What we call Anatolian Islam is Brother Hakan's term, as "Anatolian Islam." Or as "the Islam of the Turks" — he uses this term a lot, he likes it. And I too am continuing with the term he uses. Anatolian Islam is built upon Sufism, Sufi practice accepted by the people, plus Sunni fiqh, plus the legitimacy of the state. In the Seljuks, in al-Ghazali — I mean, in this way, within the Seljuks, it becomes legitimate together with al-Ghazali. I mean, a person of the Sufi path is legitimate. Among the Abbasids or among the Umayyads, it is not legitimate. Just as it is not legitimate now. But in the Anatolian understanding of Islam, a Sufi mechanism is legitimate.
This found its place, found its way, with al-Ghazali. Now, don't look at some of the people of the tariqa who later abandoned Anatolian Sufism. Look, this is a very sharp line here. Now, in Anatolia there are two Sufi paths, two tariqa paths.
The first is the channel that comes from Ahmad Yasawi. This channel coming from Ahmad Yasawi is Hazrat Rumi (Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi), you see, Hajji Bektash Wali, Hajji Bayram Wali, Yunus Emre. This channel is this. There is also another channel. It comes from Lower Mesopotamia. Today that channel can be characterised like this. I'll be stoned again, but it is the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandis. Look, Naqshbandism is a Turkic channel. I mean, it is the channel coming from Ahmad Yasawi. But later this channel takes Khalidism alongside it, and the actual Khalidi channel is dominant at present. Over Naqshbandism. This channel, I mean this Khalidi channel, imposes the Islam of Lower Mesopotamia on people.
13. The Khalidi Branch, the British Connection and the Tolerance of Anatolian Sufism
Now the debate will grow again in Turkey. Let it grow — before the Republic, some of the sheikhs and scholars of this channel were in close contact with the British. And this is my own analysis. This close contact still continues. Look, it still continues.
In the Anatolian Sufi and Islamic understanding there is no takfirism. As long as he says "la ilaha illallah Muhammadun rasulullah," whatever sin he commits — even if he drinks, even if he gambles, even if he commits fornication, whatever, whatever devilry he gets up to — as long as he does not deny, he is a Muslim. He is our brother. This is the channel coming from Ahmad Yasawi. He may drink wine, drink liquor, smoke hashish.
But go next to him and say a word against Allah, against the Prophet. He'll tear you apart in a flash. You'll take a bullet slammed right between the eyes. Next to him you cannot say a word against Allah, against the Prophet. But those coming from Lower Mesopotamia are the meek, sheepish, snivelling sort. Among them there are dergahs that came to terms with the British in the last period of the Ottomans. I believe it still continues even now. This is my heartfelt belief. If necessary, I can prove these things to you from the media and from their patterns of behaviour. Their godfather is the British Crown. Now, when you say Anatolian Islam, when we say Anatolian Islam, this continues also in the passage from the Seljuks to the Ottomans.
We are talking about al-Ghazali in the Seljuks for that time. Normally, in Anatolian Islam, although al-Ghazali did not live in Anatolia, his influence is great. Where does his great influence come from? Because of the Sufi channel. His influence is great. But which Sufi channel? The Upper Mesopotamian Sufi channel. Because it performs vocal dhikr (jahri dhikr). Al-Ghazali has nothing against vocal dhikr. He has no defensive stance against it. And normally, in the dergahs and madrasas of what we call Anatolian Islam and Sufism, the Ihya' is read. They draw standards from the Ihya'. Both on behalf of Sufism and on behalf of the dervish way.
14. Anatolian Sufism: «Sunni, Tolerant, Compassionate» — Its Difference from Shafi'i Severity
And because Anatolian Sufism, if we set out to interpret it, is 99% Sunni, and it is more embracing, more tolerant, more inclusive. It is more compassionate. It is not harsh. It is not very harsh.
It finds a place within society. It finds a place among people. It does not divide. It does not otherize. It does not say "this-ist" or "that-ist." I mean, the one who drinks alcohol is also his brother. Even if someone does not perform the prayer, he is still his brother. The prayer is one of the obligations (fard) of the religion, but he does not issue a fatwa declaring him an unbeliever just because he does not pray.
That is why, for example, although al-Ghazali was a Shafi'i, Anatolian Islam is Hanafi. Look how Anatolian Islam sets its own path. Because Shafi'i fiqh is severe, it is harsh. May the ladies forgive me. Everyone knows me as much as they are going to know me. If a woman does not wear a headscarf, according to the Shafi'i she is among the people of unbelief. This is harsh. This is not something the Turks would accept. For example, if a person drinks alcohol, according to the Shafi'i it is unbelief. The line of Imam-i A'zam (Abu Hanifa) and al-Maturidi does not accuse him of unbelief. It says he has committed a forbidden act (haram). It says repent, He will forgive you. And that is the truth of it anyway. Look, that is the truth of it. Let me apologize to you in advance.
Our brothers accept Hakan. And from the very beginning everyone loves Hakan. Our brother Hakan is a typical leftist. You still haven't given up on leftism, have you? Never. Yes. In fact, I know what he said to me in the early days. "Hajji, look, I'm going to come and ask questions there, don't tell me they won't do anything to me." Even if he says it there as a joke, that's how he says it. I say, no, come on, we're used to it, I say. Don't you worry. Ask whatever absurd questions you like, I say, but my head still hasn't hit the ceiling yet. He has a promise to me.
"I'm going to prepare such questions for you," he said. "Be careful, your head will hit the ceiling," he said. I'm waiting for those questions. Now that's why Anatolian Islam, look, we have lost these things. We have lost these things. These are very painful things. Now with us, one tariqa is different, another tariqa is different. Even the tariqas otherize one another. The religious communities (jama'at) otherize one another.
But when Islam was being established in Anatolia, for example, a Mevlevi did not otherize a Bektashi. A Bektashi did not otherize, you know, a Qadiri or a Rifa'i. He did not otherize a Bayrami. When we say the Islam of Anatolian Sufism, this is what there is.
For example, the Sheikh Efendi had told me this. May Allah have mercy on him. (Amin.) Before Çorumi, before the one from Çorum, in the time of Haji Ali Haydar Efendi, in Çorum on the blessed nights all the dergahs would gather in one place. The eldest among them would lead the dhikrullah, lead the sohbet, lead the supplication. Then they would disperse, in Çorum, with the eldest one. I mean, it wasn't "this tariqa is superior, that tariqa is superior." Out of respect for age, what would the eldest do? He would lead the dhikrullah. Dhikrullah would be performed there. Supplications would be made. Gulbanks (ritual prayers) would be recited. Everyone would revive that blessed night in this way.
Can you imagine this now? You can't imagine it like this. Isn't that so? We can't imagine it. Look where we have come to. I mean, how can we even keep this door open like this? How can a door be open? There is something else in this. For 38 years my door has stayed open. I said "my door." Not my door, but the places where I give sohbet and do dhikr, for 38 years the doors of the places where we give lessons and do dhikr have been open. The security forces come, the police come, MIT (the intelligence agency) comes, I don't know, the secret service comes. Whoever comes, let them come, here the door is open to everyone. It has been open for 38 years. This is true Sufism. The reason: behind a Sufi's mind there is no other mathematics.
In the true sense, behind a Sufi's mind there is no other mathematics. I mean, its mathematics, as I say, is the Qur'an, the Sunna, homeland and nation. Our mathematics is Qur'an-Sunna, homeland-nation. Nobody's money, wealth, property or possessions concern us.
Note: This text is the speech itself as found in the recording of the sohbet: only spelling and punctuation have been edited, and obvious mishearings in the subtitles have been corrected; a few unintelligible places have been left as heard. Section headings have been added to make reading easier. The opening and closing supplications have not been included.
Bibliography
Work: Imam al-Ghazali, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences) — The placing of Sufism within the framework of Sunni fiqh and creed
Work: Imam al-Ghazali, Fada'ih al-Batiniyya / al-Mustazhiri — A scholarly refutation of the Batini-Ismaili doctrine
Work: Nizam al-Mulk, Siyasatnama (Siyar al-Muluk) — The Seljuk vizier's guide to statecraft
Work: Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh and al-Ghiyathi — Al-Ghazali's teacher; the Ash'ari-Shafi'i synthesis of kalam
Historical Event — Manzikert (Malazgirt): 26 August 1071 — Sultan Alp Arslan's defeat of the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes; the beginning of Anatolia's becoming a Turkish-Islamic homeland. — O. Turan, Selçuklular Târihi ve Türk-İslâm Medeniyeti (History of the Seljuks and Turkish-Islamic Civilization); C. Cahen, Osmanlılardan Önce Anadolu (Pre-Ottoman Turkey)
Figure — Amid al-Mulk al-Kunduri: Vizier of the Tughril Beg period with Mu'tazili-Shi'i leanings (d. AH 456 / 1064 CE). He had Sunni Ash'ari scholars exiled; when Alp Arslan ascended the throne he was dismissed and Nizam al-Mulk was brought to the vizierate. — Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A'yan; Bedi Şerbetçi, İslâm Ansiklopedisi, entry «Kündürî»
Figure — Hasan-i Sabbah: Leader of the Nizari Ismaili doctrine (d. 1124). At the fortress of Alamut he established an organization made up of fida'i assassins; he had many Seljuk statesmen killed, including the grand vizier Nizam al-Mulk. — B. Lewis, Haşîşîler: İslâm'da Radikal Bir Tarîkat (The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam)
Figure — Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq: The sixth imam of the Ahl al-Bayt (AH 80-148 / 700-765 CE). Teacher of Imam-i A'zam Abu Hanifa, founder of the Hanafi school; a central name in the Sufi chains of transmission. Unlike the political use made of him by modern Shi'ism, he is remembered with respect by the scholars of Ahl al-Sunna. — Abu Nu'aym, Hilyat al-Awliya', III/192-202
Sufi Tradition: The Upper Mesopotamian (Turkish-Anatolian) Sufi Line: Ahmad Yasawi → Haji Bektash Veli, Rumi (Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi), Haji Bayram Veli, Yunus Emre — a tolerant, inclusive, Hanafi-Maturidi framework. — F. Köprülü, Türk Edebiyâtında İlk Mutasavvıflar (Early Mystics in Turkish Literature)
Historical Context: Nizamiyya madrasas (from AH 459 / 1067 CE onward in Baghdad, Nishapur, Balkh, Herat, Isfahan, Basra, Mosul) — the systematic institution for Sunni kalam and fiqh education; serving as intellectual armor in the Seljuk-Batini struggle. — G. Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges
This text has been compiled from the 2nd lesson of Mustafa Özbağ Efendi's «Questions on al-Ghazali» lecture series and re-edited to thesis quality. Source video: YouTube
Additional sources:
- The Holy Qur'an, al-Nahl 16/125; the principle of calling with wisdom and good counsel.
- The Holy Qur'an, al-Ahzab 33/21; the Messenger of Allah as the beautiful example.
- al-Nawawi, Riyad al-Salihin, chapters on taqwa, sincerity (ikhlas) and good character.
- Imam al-Ghazali, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din, chapters on the training of the heart, ethics and sincerity.
- al-Bukhari, Books of Iman and Riqaq, narrations on intention, sincerity and character.
- Muslim, Book of Birr and Sila, narrations on good character and brotherhood.
- al-Tirmidhi, Books of Birr and Sila, Zuhd and Da'awat.
- al-Nawawi, Riyad al-Salihin, chapters on sincerity, taqwa, dhikr and good character.
- Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani, Fath al-Bari, commentary on the relevant narrations of al-Bukhari.
- al-Qushayri, al-Risala, sections on the etiquette of Sufism, states and stations.